Una solución a la paradoja de las aportaciones federales para los municipios
AbstractThesis winning the First Place of the National Public Finance Award 2013 of the Center for Public Finance Studies of the Congress of the Union. This research starts from the premise that the bureaucrats in charge of the implementation of resources at the local level will act rationally when trying to maximize their budget when the deficiencies whose existence guarantees greater allocation of resources are not intentionally eliminated, in the absence of adequate incentives or direct controls. Currently, they operate in the face of the failure caused by the allocation formula that is exclusively proportional to the lag margin, which contains incentives for it to be preserved as a budget maximization strategy since it penalizes the reduction of the welfare lag. Therefore, the alignment of incentives is required from the design of the formula to stop penalizing achievement and to avoid harmful behaviors. One possible way to solve this problem would be the incorporation of fiscal incentives that enhance performance through the incorporation of welfare achievements as part of the components of the allocation formula. Thus, attention to deficiencies or achievement is transformed into "a good", instead of "a bad" as happens when the budget is cut due to the good performance of the local government.